Inventing Accuracy -- McKenzie

Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance

Donald McKenzie, MIT Press, 1990. ISBN 0-262-13258-3

McKenzie examines the development of nuclear missile guidance systems as a historical product and social creation. Previous examinations of guidance systems have tended to view them from a technological determinist perspective, i.e., that guidance systems naturally evolved to increasing missile accuracy, and that nuclear strategies are determined by this technology. McKenzie rejects this view. In this well-researched, extensive narrative he explains his concepts of sociology of technology.

McKenzie begins by examining the myth of technological development as a sudden flash of insight. He contrasts this with the myth of technological development as application of science, i.e., the application of money, time, and resources will inevitably result in technological development. McKenzie shows how Charles Draper at MIT used "heterogeneous engineering" to successfully develop inertial navigation.

McKenzie continues with the development of ballistic missiles. He shows how the development of America's missile arsenal was more the result of the interplay between the armed forces, industry, and government than it was any kind of operational assessment of requirements: ".. the initiative for new missile systems came largely from below." (pg. 162). McKenzie introduces the concept of a 'mafia' as a force for control of the direction of technology development.

McKenzie next discusses the concept of 'technological trajectory', the direction of 'natural' technical development. McKenzie rejects this concept: "What is wrong is the fundamental idea that technological change can be self-sustaining, that its direction . . . can be explained in isolation from the social circumstances in which it takes place." (pg. 167). McKenzie contrasts the inertial guidance trajectory with the development of civilian inertial navigation, which reached a plateau of accuracy and then went on to improvements in reliability and cost.

McKenzie goes on to examine the Navy's ballistic missile program. Initially viewed as a countercity weapon, with a corresponding de-emphasis on missile accuracy, it was transformed into a highly accurate counterforce weapon without significant opposition. McKenzie compares the Navy program with the MX missile and concludes that the difference in acceptance (Navy) vs. opposition (MX) has more to do with the successful approach of the Navy program managers than with any technical aspects.

McKenzie next briefly examines the Soviet Union's missile guidance development. While the technologies are different, the process resembled the US pattern. McKenzie goes on to examine the foundations of technical fact. He shows that the closer 'facts' are examined, the less solid they seem to be; beneath every fact are assumptions and context that can be interpreted or misinterpreted.

McKenzie sums up by railing against technological determinism as well as political determinism. He states that in the US, at least, it's difficult to conclude that a technological direction was the result of the state's decision to pursue it. Rather, the jumble of conflicting personal and institutional interests result in technological developments that may seem inexplicable on a macropolitical level. McKenzie concludes with a burst of anti-nuclear sentiment that seems inappropriate in this context.